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The Noble Business of "lncumbantocracy:" A Response to The
Sordid Business Of Democracy 1
CHRISTOPHER J. ROEDERER•

If democracy is a sordid business-a base, dirty, and ignoble business
then perhaps it is not too much of a stretch to say that there is something
simple, clean, and noble about the business of "incumbantocracy." This
should ring a discordant note. "lncumbantocracy," and not democracy, is the
problem which calls for the courts to intervene. "lncumbantocracy" involves
the sordid business of gerrymandering districts and fixing elections so that
those in power stay in power, regardless of what the voters might wish or how
they vote.2 "Incumbantocracy" is dirty politics, and trying to eliminate this
practice is, no doubt, a dirty and difficult job; but one should not confuse the
problem with the solution. If democracy is, in fact, a sordid business, the
alternatives are much worse. As Abraham Lincoln once said, democracy
consists of a "government of the people, by the people, for the people. "3
Democracy is supposed to include the "continuing responsiveness of the

I. This essay is a response to Daniel Tokaji, The Sordid Business ofDemocracy, 34 Ohio N.U. L.
Rev. 341 (2008). The tenn "incumbatocracy" appears to have been coined by Jamin B. Raskin in The
Supreme Court's Double Standard, where he argued that "voters don't really pick public officials on
Election Day because public officials pick voters on redistricting day." THE NATION, Feb. 6, 1995, at I6768.
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law; Senior Research Fellow, University
of the Witwaters and School of Law. The author thanks Melanie Schneider from Florida Coastal School
of Law for her able research assistance, Professors Cleveland Ferguson and Gerald Moran for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this work, and Professor Burt Neuborn for clarifying a few points in relation
to his own work on the subject.
2. As Burt Neubom states, "[t]he major party in this country is neither the Republicans nor the
Democrats. It is the Incumbent party that runs the country. The incumbent party draws the district lines so
that you simply cannot defeat an Incumbent." Burt Neubom, Campaign Finance and Political
Gerrymandering Decisions in the October 2005 Term, 22 T0UR0 L. REV. 939, 944 (2007). It is important
to note that while the House of Representative is an incumbantocracy, that form of government has not
quite taken over the Senate or the Presidency. This is because Senate races are statewide and not based on
gerrymandered districts and because in most states in the U.S. the Electoral College votes in block based
on who wins a majority in the state (except in Maine and Nebraska). There is a recent disturbing trend
underfoot to undermine the democratic process in the case of Presidential elections. The law finn for the
California Republican Party has sponsored ballot Initiative No. 07-00032, The Presidential Election Refonn
Act, which is designed to allocate electoral votes by district instead of in block or winner take all. Hendrick
Henzberg, Comment: Votescam, The New Yorker (August 6, 2007). Note that the Democrats are proposing
the same thing in North Carolina. Id.
3. Abraham Lincoln, 16th President of the United States of America (1861-65), The Gettysburg
Address (Nov. 19, 1863). The U.S. State Department begins its discussion of the definition of "What is
Democracy" with Lincoln• s definition. U.S. Department of State, What is Democracy? (1998) (quotation
omitted), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/whatdm2.htm.
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government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals. "4
The present state of "incumbantocracy" in the U.S. all but ensures that
"representatives" do not, in fact, represent the people. They are not
accountable or responsive because there is little to no political pressure to
keep them accountable.
Professor Tokaji's illuminating article, The Sordid Business of
Democracy, embraces the role of the courts in policing or superintending the
"messy business of democracy."5 In this article, ProfessorTokaji uses the lens
of democratic values in order to bring clarity to the voting rights case, League
of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry ("LULAC"),6 and to all voting
rights cases in general.7 More importantly, he uses LULAC in an attempt to
identify a role for the federal courts in securing the democratic process.
He examines the voting rights jurisprudence through the lens of the four
"norms of democracy," which he believes are at stake in these cases.8 These
norms include: 1) minority representation, 2) raceblindness, 3) anti-entrench
ment, and 4) state sovereignty.9 These norms are overlapping and yet com
peting with one another, so that too much emphasis on one is said to detract
from one or more of the others. 10 He is largely successful in illustrating how
the Supreme Court has taken a somewhat strong position on all four norms at
different times, only to pull back, or retreat, to a more modest position on all
four norms. 11 The pull of these competing norms, he explains, accounts for
the seeming incoherence of the court's approach to this area of the law. 12 He
claims that LULAC is somewhat unique in that it lies within the overlap of
these often competing norms. 13
More importantly, ProfessorTokaji should be commended for attempting
to identify a "seed of encouragement" 14 in LULAC for those who believe, or
perhaps hope, that the federal courts either have, or should have, an important

4. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition l (1971).
5. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 341.
6. 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
7. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 342.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 349.
11. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 353. However, I believe that Proffessor Tokaji would admit that he is
not successful in showing that the Court has ever taken a strong stance on the value of anti-entrenchment.
Not only has the Court never found a redistricting plan to be partisan enough to violate the norm, the norm
as stated by Professor Tokaji is very weak from the perspective of a thriving democracy, namely - "there
ought to be some competition between the political parties, at least for some legislative seats." Id. at 350.
12. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 342-43.
13. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 353.
14. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 342.
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role in helping American democracy function better. 15 Most of the
commentators on LULAC would identify a "seed of encouragement" in the
fact that five out of the nine Justices still hold out hope of a justiciable, con
stitutional, equal protection claim in a future political gerrymandering case. 16
Professor Tokaji writes almost apologetically concerning the majority's
decision to avoid the equal protection-based political gerrymandering claim,
which it found to be nonjusticiable on the grounds that there was not a
judicially manageable standard in front of the Court. 17 He does not locate the
glimmer of hope, or "seed of encouragement" here, but rather in the plurality's
decision to hold that the Tom Delay-backed Texas redistricting of District 23
violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 18 Professor Tokaji argues that the
heart of the section 2 debate provides encouragement for those who believe
that the federal courts have an important role to play in "making American
democracy function better." 19 He posits that this is because the statutory
interpretation, found here, borrows from a process-based approach to
constitutional law, as found in Carolene Products footnote four2° and the
earlier works of the late John Hart Ely. 21 This borrowing, he argues, furthers
democratic values.22
Although it is not my goal to destroy the seed of hope, I do not have the
same rosy view of the current state of "American democracy," and I am not
sure that the "seed of encouragement" has much room to develop under
LULAC or within our current electoral practices. My reasons for this
somewhat less rosy view are that:
(1) Our system is so far off the track of democracy23 that it is
incorrect to view federal courts' interventions as interventions
in the "messy business of democracy." Rather, those
15. Id.
16. While two Justices (Justices Thomas and Scalia) do not believe such claims can ever be
justiciable, and two others (Chief Justice Roberts and Ali to) are agnostic or uncommitted on the issue, five
Justices (Justices Bryer, Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter and Kennedy) are open to the possibility of a justiciable
standard to resolve these cases. See e.g., Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry
As A Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After LUI.AC v. Perry 6 ELECTION L. J. 2, 34 (2007)
(stating, in regard to the possibility of a justiciable standard for a constitutional equal protection claim in
political gerrymandering cases: "In our view, if we look closely at the various opinions in LULAC, we can
see that the Supreme Court has seeded the clouds after 20 years drought.").
17. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 353.
18. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 342.
19. Id.
20. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
21. John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEoRY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
22. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 342.
23. For a full argument on this point, see Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Reform in
America: The Counter-Revolution, 110 W. VIRGINIA L. REV. 647 (2008).

376

OHIO NORTHERN UNNERSITY I.AW REVIEW

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

I.

[Vol. 34

interventions are interventions of a limited nature into the
corrupt practices of "incumbantocracy."
It was not the minority-protecting, democratic-process approach
to interpretation, as found in footnote 4 of Carotene Products,24
that drove the Court to its interpretation of the section 2 claim in
the case of District 23,25 but rather it was the Voting Rights Act
that pulled the Court into making a decision that was consistent
with a minority-protecting process view.
The success of the section 2 claim in the case of District 2326 had
more to do with Justice Kennedy's animus towards the newly
created minority-majority Latino District 25 than with protecting
the democratic process. 27
If the minority-protecting, democratic-process approach to
interpretation drove the Court's decision in District 23' s section
2 claim, then one would expect the same values and the same
approach to come to the forefront in the section 2 claim
regarding District 24; but it did not, and that claim failed.28
Although racial discrimination in voting is still an issue,29 the
overwhelming problem is with partisan gerrymandering. This
practice receives little to no scrutiny under existing U.S. voting
laws, and there is minimal hope for protection under LUI.AC in
the future.

THE U.S. D OESNOTPRESENTLYHAVEADEMOCRACYFOR THE COURTS
TO SUPERINTEND.

Unfortunately, the problem is not one of hoping that the Courts will
superintend the borders of a thriving democracy. The system is in such
disrepair that there is very little of that "messy business of democracy" taking
place. Rather, what is needed is for the courts to intervene in the corrupt
practices of "incumbantocracy" in order to put the system back on the

24.
25.
26.
27.

United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Tokaji, supra note I, at 356-57.

Id.

Tokaji, supra note I, at 355. As ProfessorTokaji notes, Richard H. Pildes made this argument
in The Decline in Legally MafliUJted Minority Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1144 (2007)
(arguing that this view of the case squares Kennedy's opinion with his hostility to the compelled creation
of majority-minority districts, e.g., in Georgia v. Ashcroft 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (Kennedy, I. concurring)).
28. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2624-2626 (2006).
29. See e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Let's Not Call the Whole Thing OffJust Yet: A Response to Samuel
Issachorojfs Suggestion to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L. REV. 605 (2005)
(referring specifically to discriminatory voting practices in Georgia).
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democratic track. As an historian of voting, Alexander Keyssar, states:
"Although the formal right to vote is now nearly universal, few observers
would characterize the United States as a vibrant democracy[.]"30
In 2004, the American Political Science Association warned that
American democracy was in peril. They delivered this warning with a press
release31 and through a set of reports commissioned by the Association.32
Those reports located the cause of this demise in the widening gap between
the rich and poor. As its authors stated, "(p]rogress toward realizing [the]
American ideals of democracy may have stalled, and in some arenas
reversed," due to the broadening gap in income and wealth in America.33 The
impact of the gap between the "haves" and "have-nots" on democracy is
explored in detail in the American Political Science Association Task Force
Reports on Inequality and American Democracy.34 In describing the results
of the report, two of its authors stated:
[The] privileged participate more than others and are increasingly
well organized to press their demands on government. Public
officials, in tum, are much more responsive to the privileged than to
average citizens and the least affluent. Citizens with lower or
moderate incomes speak with a whisper that is lost on the ears of
inattentive government officials, while the advantaged roar with a
clarity and consistency that policy-makers readily hear and routinely
follow. 35
30. ALExANDERKEYSSAR,THERIGHTTOVOTE:THECONTESTEDHISTORYOFDEMOCRACY INTHE
UNITED STATES 4,320 (2001). For the view that our democracy is crumbling based on current obstacles
to voting, see SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION
(2006).
31. Press Release, American Political Science Association, Leading Political Scientists Warn of
Threat to American Democracy in Rare Nonpartisan Statement (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/
taskforcepress.pdf.
32. The task force compiled a series of reports in 2004: AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF
RISING INEQUALITY; THREE CRITICAL ANALYSES ON ECONOMIC, GENDER, RACIAL,AND E1HNIC INEQUALITIES
IN AMERICAN POLITICS; and a set of teaching materials. The American Political Science Association, Task
Force on Inequality and American Democracy, http://www.apsanet.org/section_256.cfm (last visited Nov.
5,2007). These materials were edited into a book. INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE
KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN (Lawrence R. Jacobs &Theda Skocpol eds., 2005).
33. TASKFoRCE ONlNEQUALITY&AM.DEMOCRACY,AM.POL.SCI. Ass'N,AMERICANDEMOCRACY
IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY I (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport.pdf. This is
not to say that healthy levels of economic inequality are antithetical to democracy.Certain levels and certain
forms of economic inequality become problematic from the standpoint of democracy when they undermine
either fair equality of opportunity or our civil and political liberties.
34. TASK FORCE REPORTS, supra note 33.
35. INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN
27 (LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL EDS., 2005). See also Kay Lehman Schlozman, On
Inequality and Political Voice: Response to Stephen Earl Bennett's Critique, 39 POL. SCI. &POL. 55, 56
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According to some studies, the poorest one-third ofAmericans have virtually
no influence on national legislation and the bottom two-thirds have less than
half the influence of the top one-third. 36
There can be little doubt that economic inequality has undermined
American democracy, but how is this so? If American democratic processes
were functioning correctly, economic inequality would not result in inequality
ofresponsiveness and accountability. Ifthe democratic process were working
properly, then the poor person's vote would not count any less than that ofthe
rich person's. 37 Politicians would need to listen, to be responsive to, and to
be accountable to all ofthe electorate. "Incumbantocracy" short circuits these
processes. If the incumbents are allowed to gerrymander districts in order to
rig the outcome of the next election, then there is little need to listen to the
voters, much less be responsive or accountable to them. This, in tum, leads
to even lower voter tumout38 and to further erosion of other forms of
democratic participation. 39 Thus, we need the courts to intervene, not in order

(2006) (referring to KAY L. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM. DEMOCRACY,
INEQUALITIES OF POLITICAL VOICE, 30-33 (2004), available at http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/
voicememo.pdf.
36. Larry Bartels, Is the Water Rising? Reflections on Inequality and American Democracy, 39 PoL.
SCI. & POL. 39, 40 (2006); See also Stephen Macedo & Christopher Karpowitz, The Local Roots of
Inequality, 39 POL. SCI. & POL. 59, 60 (2006); Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political
Representation (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Princeton University), available at
www.princeton.edu/-bartels/economic.pdf; Martin Gilens, Public Opinion and Democratic Responsive
ness: Who Gets What they Wantfrom Government? (2003), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-csdp/
events/pdfs/Gilens.pdf.
See also Martin Gilens, discussing Public Opinion and Democratic
Responsiveness: Who Gets What they Want from Government? The Center for Study of Democratic
Politics, Princeton University, conference on Global Inequality (Nov. 7-8, 2003).
37. Unquestionably, campaign finance law also contributes heavily to the current state of affairs.
At the end of 2002, Congress increased hard money campaign contribution limits in the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act (McCain-Feingold Bill), 2 U.S.C. § 4 4 lb(b)(2) (2000) (upheld in McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)). This basically means that those with more money get more access. Although
state based limits on campaign finance have generally been upheld, limits on campaign spending have not.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). This has created incredible pressure to find loopholes in the
finance regulations so as to feed the demand. Although some of these holes were plugged through the
McCain-Feingold Bill, many loopholes remain. Recently, the Court, for the first time, struck down a state's
campaign finance restrictions. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (striking down Vermont's
campaign finance restrictions as being so low as to infringe the First Amendment).
38. See KEYSSAR supra note 30, at 320. According to the International Institute for Democratic and
Electoral Assistance, the U.S. ranks 138th out of 169 countries in voter turnout. RAFAEL L6PEZ PINTOR
ET AL., VOTER l'URNOUT RATES FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 75, 83-84 (2002) (citing statistics of
averages of voting age population ratios across 169 countries in parliamentary elections from 1945-2001,
compiled by the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance).
39. KAY L. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM. DEMOCRACY, INEQUALITIES
OF POLITICAL VOICE 22, 38 (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/voicememo.pdf.
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to police the contours of a thriving democracy, but in order to restore the
system to something that would be worthy of the name.
II.

THE LUIACCOURT DID NOT BRING A PROCESS APPROACH TO THE ACT
FROMCONSTITUTIONALINTERPRETATION. RATHER,THEVOTINGRIGHTS
ACT ITSELF EMBODIES DEMOCRATIC PROCESS VALUES, PARTICULARLY
WITH REGARD TO THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.

As Professor Tokaji notes, the democratic process view, as found in
footnote four to United States v. Carolene Products,40 justifies the Court's
practice of more carefully scrutinizing state legislation when "discrete and
insular minorities" are involved41 • This is because it cannot be assumed that
normal democratic political processes will adequately represent or protect
such minorities. This is particularly true given the form of this country's
voting system, which does not provide proportional representation.42
Although it is not entirely clear whether Professor Tokaji finds a glimmer
of hope in the process-based view of constitutional interpretation or the
democratic value of anti-entrenchment,43 he argues that even though the Court
has declined to protect the democratic process under the rubric of
constitutional law, it does so when it interprets section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. He makes the rather remarkable claim that:
If this case is any indication, the Court will likely be reluctant to inter
vene on constitutional grounds, even in cases where there is arguably
a breakdown of the democratic processes that can ordinarily be relied
upon to protect minorities. On the other hand, it is possible that the
Court will resort to statutory interpretation to achieve a similar end.44
This raises the question as to why the Court would decline to protect the
democratic process on constitutional grounds, yet be willing to protect it on
statutory grounds. One answer that is consistent with Professor Tokaji's
framework is that the constitutional equal protection claim only included the
issue of discrimination based on political affiliation, not based on race or
40. 304 U.S. 144 n.4 (1938).
41. Id. Tokaji, supra note l, at 357-58.
42. Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems,
18(3) INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 297-3 1 2 (1997) (SPECIAL ISSUE), available at
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Acrobat/IPSR%20Choosing%20Electoral%20Systems.pdf.
43. Tokaji, supra note 1, at 357. According to Professor Tokaji, the section 2 claim was not merely
about racial vote dilution, but also about "curbing entrenchment by those in power," and therefore, he
believes that this may be a signal that that the Court will "more carefully scrutiniz.e incumbent-protecting
gerrymandering than it has in the past." It should be noted that illegitimate entrenchment is one result of
a flawed political process.
44. Id. at 358.
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minority status, while the section 2 claims also included a claim of discrimina
tory impact on a discrete and insular minority. Thus, the latter claims
included another process factor-namely the discrete and insular minority
factor. This is consistent with Tokaji's argument that the Court borrowed
from the process approach to constitutional interpretation in order to arrive at
a decision that would help democracy function better. Although it is not
completely implausible to locate the seed of hope in the Court's approach to
section 2, it is not the best explanation for the seed's origination.
The seed of hope for policing the democratic process is not located in the
Court's approach to section 2, but rather, is located within section 2 and the
Voting Rights Act itself. It is not as if the Court brought the values and tools
of the process approach to bear on an otherwise neutral piece of legislation.
This was not what Cass Sunstein would call "judicial maximalism."45 The
Court did not need to engage in a great deal of interpretive work on section 2,
in order to bring it into conformity with democratic process values or the
process approach. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act embodies the process
view, and the drafters specifically designed it to protect minorities within the
electoral process. As the Court in LULAC stated:
A State violates § 2 if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is
shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election
in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of [a racial group] in that its members have
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.46
The Court has not taken the process approach and used it to expansively
interpret this language in order to police the democratic process, either in
general or in the case of minority voting. The Court does not apply section 2
to cases of political gerrymandering or even to the dilution of minority
population voting in general. Rather, the Court only entertains the merits of
section 2 claims under carefully circumscribed conditions.
As Justice Kennedy noted in LULAC, the Court requires that three
threshold conditions must be met in order to demonstrate a violation of section
45. Judicial maximalism involves the Court engaging in deep and broad theoretical reasoning in a
given case. See e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999) (contrasting minimalist and maximalist approaches to adjudication and arguing for a
minimalist view in most cases, based on deliberative democratic grounds). See ch. 2 and 9. Note, however,
that Sunstein acknowledges a need for deeper or more theoretically ambitious judicial decisions in cases
where the democratic process can be shown to be "defective from the standpoint of the inner morality of
the law." Id. at 245.
46. League ofUnited Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2613-26 I 4(2006)(quoting
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2007)) (quotations omitted).
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2(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 pertaining to vote dilution.47 Those
conditions, which are known as the Gingles requirements, are: "(1) the racial
group [must be] sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district; (2) the racial group [must be] politically
cohesive; and (3) the majority [must vote] sufficiently as a bloc to enable
it ...usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."48
Section 2 claims are limited to districts in which the minority was a
majority before the redistricting. One can only successfully invoke section 2
vote dilution within the context of a district in which a particular minority
group not only constitutes the majority, but is also politically cohesive enough
that it votes as a block to defeat the minority candidate. If these three
conditions are met, then the Court will turn to a totality of the circumstances
test to determine if "members of a racial group have less opportunity than do
other members of the electorate."49
In LUIAC, District 23 satisfied the three Gingles requirements. 50 These
judicially-created requirements ensure that the broad protections of section 2
are reserved for a few clear, bright-line cases in which a minority should be
able to elect the candidate of its choice. It excludes all other cases in which
minorities represent the minority vote in their districts or when they would not
be able to defeat the majority's candidate. In such cases, the otherwise broad
democratic process-protecting provisions of section 2 simply do not aid the
minority voter.51
The Court is willing to approach section 2 from a process-based approach
and is willing to superintend the democratic process, because Congress
mandated it in the Voting Rights Act. The Act requires the Court to find a
judicially manageable approach to section 2 claims, which as noted above, the

47. LUI.AC, 126 S. Ct. at 2614.
48. Id. at 2614 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)) (quotations omitted).
49. LUI.AC, 126 S. Ct. at 2614.
50. Id. at 2615-16.
51. See e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 & n.17 (1986). Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority in Gingles argued that there was no injury to the minority voter if they could not have elected the
representative of their choice, but for the redistricting. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2007). Section 2 speaks
of injuries to members of a minority group, while Gingles appears to require that the injury be to the whole
group as a voting block. If the minority is not a majority and does not vote as a cohesive block, there can
be no injury under Gingles. Nothing in the text of section 2 compels this narrow view of the injury.
Section 2 focuses on "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice." Id. There is a very large range of injuries to individual
members of a minority group, in tenns of each one's ability to elect representatives of his or her choice, in
comparison to other members of the electorate, that fall short of the Gingles bar. The range can run from
necessitating that one who is running for office receive the vast majority of the minority voters in order to
get elected (and having to show that one will represent their interests) to not requiring any of their votes
(and not having to represent any of their interests).
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Court interprets narrowly. It is unwilling to cross the street and apply the
same reasoning to constitutional claims, in large part because the Court lacks
a consensus as to the appropriate remedy. The old adage from Marbury v.
Madison was that the violation of a right required a remedy.52 The Court has
flipped this addage, and since it cannot agree on a remedy, it will not
recognize the violation of the right.53
ill.

THE COURT'S DECISION REGARDING DISTRICT 23 WAS MORE
INFLUENCED BY ANEGATIVEREACTION TO THECREATION OFMINORITY
MAJORITY DISTRICTS, THAN BY A NEED TO PROTECT MINORITIES IN THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

District 23 satisfied the three Gingles requirements because the redrawn
district lines decreased the Latino voting share from 57.5% to 46%; this was
in a district where it was clear that the vast majority of Latinos had voted
against the incumbent.54 Thus, the Court held that the Latinos in District 23
were denied an equal opportunity to successfully elect their preferred
candidate.55 This holding is rather unremarkable. Seven members of the Court
would agree that the dilution of District 23 violated section 2;56 only Justices
Scalia and Thomas held otherwise.57 The Chief Justice's dissent, joined by
Justice Alito, was not based on the argument that the Latino vote was diluted

52. 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall quotes Blackstone for the proposition that "it
is a general and indisputable rule that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or
action at law whenever that right is invaded." Wil.l1AM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 23 (1765-1769).
53. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's attack on remedies since the time of the Rehnquist
Court. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Ton Law: Due Process and the right to a Law
for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005); Andrew M. Siegel, The Coun Against the Courts:
Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Coun's Jurisprudence, 84 TEx. L. REV.
1097 (2006); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal
Power, 78 IND. L. J. 223 (2003); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Couns: Hostility to Litigation
as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Coun's Jurisprudence, 84 TEx. L. REV. 1097 (2006).
Christopher J. Roederer, Another Case in Lochner's Legacy, The Coun's Assault on New Property, 54
DRAKE L. REv. 321, 341-42, 342-351, 360 (2006); Roederer, supra note 23 at section V.B. l "Constricting
Remedies."
54. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2006).
55. Id. at 2615-16.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2663 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that section 2 of the Voting rights Act
does not allow for vote dilution claims at all). Justice Scalia stated that he "would dismiss appellants' vote
dilution claims premised on § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for failure to state a claim, for the reasons
set forth in JusticeThomas's opinion, which I joined, inHolderv. Hall." (citing Holder, 512 U.S. 874, 891946 (1994)). In Holder, Justice Thomas argued that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act only applies to a
"voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure" and that voter dilution
claims are not captured by the terms "standard, practice, or procedure."
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in District 23, but was based on the argument that the newly-created Latino
District 25 compensated for the dilution in District 23. 58
Texas Republicans cleverly created a new Latino district-District 25that combined geographically and politically-disparate Latinos. Although
Latinos would, no doubt, have control over the district, they were not
politically cohesive and, thus, were unlikely to vote as a block. Although the
Chief Justice saw this gerrymandered, Latino-packed district as more than
compensating for the loss of District 23,59 Justice Kennedy and a majority of
the Court did not agree.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, based his decision on a number
of points. First, the right to vote is an individual right secured for individual
voters who meet the three Gingles requirements, and therefore, the violation
of those rights cannot be repaired by giving another group of minority voters,
in another location, more concentrated voting power.60 Second, the creation
of a non-compact district cannot compensate for the breaking up or cracking
of a compact district.61 Third, if the Court allowed the non-compact district
to remedy the break up of the existing compact district, it would be applying
different standards to the State than those applied to the claimants. It would
allow states to create non-compact districts to prevent claimants from demon
strating that their district is compact, in order to satisfy the Gingles require
ments.62 This would allow states to break up compact districts and to create
new minority districts, which do not satisfy the Gingles requirements; thus,
minorities within such a district could not bring section 2 claims in the future.
Fourth, the minorities combined into District 25 are not only geographically
disparate but also constitute "'disparate communities of interest' with
'differences in socio-economic status, education employment, health and other
characteristics."'63 Finally, "'[t]he purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to
prevent discrimination in the exercise of the electoral franchise and to foster
our transformation to a society that is no longer fixated on race."'64
In its analysis of District 25, the Court focused little attention on process
arguments or on arguments regarding the need to protect discrete and insular
minorities. Rather, Justice Kennedy relied on individual rights and the pursuit
of colorblindness in support of his opinion. The new district is a perfect
example of why a court might be hostile to group rights or mandated minority58. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2652-2663 (2006).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2616.
61. LUU..C, 126 S. Ct. at 2617.
62. Id. at 2617-18.
63. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2617 (2006) (quoting the
district court's findings).
64. Id. (quoting Georgia v. Ashcroft 539 U.S. 461, 490 (2003)).
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majority districts; they tend to perpetuate a stereotype that everyone within a
minority population is the same and that individual rights can be sacrificed for
the sake of group rights.
This line of argument does not draw from the same well as Carotene
Products footnote four, which calls for heightened scrutiny to protect discrete
and insular minorities, who are in danger of being inadequately protected by
the democratic process, since those groups, by definition, have minority repre
sentation in that process. Rather, this line of reasoning is more consistent with
Justice Kennedy's hostility towards mandatory minority-majority districts. As
Tokaji notes, the Justice Department was aggressive in compelling the
creation of "safe minority districts" during the 1990s,65 and the Court, since
the 1990s, has wanted to curtail the creation of such safe districts.66
Although Professor Tokaji is unclear as to why the Department of Justice
created those safe districts in the first place, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
provides the authority for their creation. Section 5 applies to states and
counties that were found to have a history of systematically discriminating
against minority voters.67 Section 5 covers eight states in totality (Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and
Texas),68 and it applies to specific counties and townships in eight other States
(Virginia, North Carolina, New York, California, Florida, South Dakota,
Michigan and New Hampshire).69 When these jurisdictions had a rampant
history of discrimination, the Act set up a mechanism to insure that they did
not slide back into racial gerrymandering.70 This mechanism requires covered
jurisdictions to get preclearance from either the Department of Justice or the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia before they can make
any changes to their voting practices or procedures (including changes to
voting districts). 71
The practice of creating minority-safe districts is a mechanism for
insulating minorities from vote-dilution.72 While the packing or concentration
65. Daniel P. Tokaji, IfIt's Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance,49 How. L.J.
785, 799-806 (2006).
66. Id.
67. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, 79 Stat.439 (1965) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(2007)).
68. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions,
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt//voting/sec_5/covered.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
69. Id. In fact, there are very few counties or townships that are covered in Florida, California,
Michigan, South Dakota, New Hampshire and New York.
70. Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of /965: The
Continued Need for Preclearance, 51 Tenn. L. Rev. I, 13, 26-27 (1983).
71. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, 79 Stat. 439 (1965) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(2007)).
72. For a defense of majority-minority electoral districts, see Laughlin McDonald, What Happened
to the Voting Rights Act? Or Restoring the White Primary, J. S. LEGAL HIST. 207-45 (1999).
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of minorities within certain districts in the 1990s may have been done to
"bleach" surrounding white areas and increase the number of Republicans in
Congress,73 it also had the effect of increasing minority representation.74 From
the perspective of protecting minority-voting rights, it also had the effect of
maintaining the cohesiveness of minority-voting blocks, which preserved the
ability of a given minority to meet the Gingles requirements in order bring
section 2 claims in the future.75
ProfessorTokaji refers the reader to Richard Pildes's forthcoming article,
in which Pildes argues that Justice Kennedy's decision in LULAC was
primarily animated by his hostility towards legally-mandated safe minority
districts and to the race essentialism that District 25 embodies.76 Pildes goes
further and raises concerns that Justice Kennedy's decision might double-back
and impact Shaw claims77 and section 5 dismantling claims.78 Although
Justice Kennedy stopped short of holding that District 25 alone violated
section 2 of the Act, Pildes fears that future Shaw-type claims, attacking race
based districting, will be able to draw on Justice Kennedy's decision in order
to challenge districts that are not "ideologically coherent."79 While Shaw
merely required geographical coherence, Justice Kennedy believed this was

73. Tokaji, If It's Broke, Fix It, supra note 65, at 801.
74. Id. at 800. As Tokaji himself notes:
After the post-1990 redistricting, the number of African Americans elected to Southern state
legislatures increased from 204 to 260, while the number of African Americans elected to
Congress from the South increased more than fourfold, going from four to seventeen.
Nationwide, the number of Blacks elected to the House went from twenty-one in the 98th
Congress (1983-85) to thirty-nine in the 103rd Congress (1993-1995). The number of
Latinos also increased, going from twelve to twenty in this period.
Id.

75. This assumes, of course, that the packing is not in the mold of District 25 in Texas, which packs
minorities together from different regions, who are not politically cohesive, do not share interests, and are
unlikely to vote as block.
76. Tokaji, supra note l , at 356; Pildes, supra note 27, at 1146.
77. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (2003), and its progeny represent a line of cases in which white
voters have brought equal protection challenges to districts drawn on race-conscious grounds.
78. Pildes, supra note 27, at 1145, 1148. As Pildes states:
The Shaw cases had held that race-conscious districting had to be limited, for constitutional
reasons, to districts that were reasonably compact geographically. LULAC now adds to this
the constraint that such districts must be, not only geographically compact, but ideologically
coherent-and, most importantly, coherent in a deeper or broader sense than that minority
voters share a preference for minority candidates pitted against majority ones. That is,
districts must be 'culturally' as well as geographically compact.
Id. at 1145.
19. Id. at 1145.
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insufficient in the context of a section 2 claim.80 Pildes's second worry is that
districts lacking ideological compactness might not be covered by the stronger
protection of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits "retrogres
sion." He argues, "[i]f there were no legal obligation to create such a district
in the first place, as the Court now understands the Act, then undoing such a
district might not be retrogressive."81
While Professor Pildes's concerns might be slightly exaggerated, they
make it clear that LULAC does not adopt a process view of section 2 claims
as its goal. Protecting discrete and insular minorities in the political _process
is neither its primary aim, nor its probable effect.
N. THE SEED OF HOPE, WHICH PROFESSOR TOKAJI CLAIMS CAN BE FOUND
IN THE DISTRICT 23 CLAIM, DID NOT SURVIVE IN THE DISTRICT 24
CLAIM.

Unlike District 23, in which the three requirements above were met,82 the
three requirements were not met in the case of District 24. 83 District 24 had
two minority voting blocks-one black and one Latin�which consisted of
approximately 26% and 21% of the voting population, respectively.84 The
Anglo voters constituted just under 50% of voters.85 The black vote was
considered a swing vote that, if cast in a block, would determine the outcome
of the election (in fact, it had ensured that the Anglo incumbent, Martin Frost,
was reelected every time since 1974). 86 District 24 argued that their vote
would ensure the reelection of Frost and that by cracking the district and
splitting the black vote, the Republicans had diluted their vote under section
2.81

The Court noted that, even if one assumed that it might be possible for
a racial group that did not make up the majority of voters within a district to
get over the first prong of the three-part test, it would still need to show that
it could elect a candidate of its choice.88 Since the incumbent was an Anglo
Democrat who had never had any opposition in the primary, the Court held

80. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2006). It should be
noted that Justice Kennedy referenced the difference between Shaw-type equal rights claims and section
2 voting rights claims, noting that geographical compactness was at issue in the former type of case, while
minority group compactness was at issue in the later type of case.
81. Pildes, supra note 27, at 1148.
82. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2615-16.
83. Id. at 2624-26.
84. Id. at 2624.
85. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2624 (2006).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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that it was just as plausible that this was an Anglo-Democratic district. 89
Through somewhat strange logic,testimony that the Anglo incumbent might
not have truly served the African-American community evinced that it was not
clearly erroneous for the court below to hold that black voters could not elect
their candidate of choice.90
While they did not get their candidate of first choice, their block (no
doubt) ensured that they did not end up with a candidate that was their last
choice. In other words, while they lacked the power to put up their own
candidate, who could effectively challenge the Democratic incumbent in the
primary,they appeared to have the power to ensure that the Anglo-Democrat
would be elected over the Republican opponent. The Court, by allowing for
the Republicans to crack the black vote in this way, ensured that they would
not have the power to keep their last choice out of office.
If the process-based approach of Carolene Products footnote four carried
much weight, one would think that Justice Kennedy would agree with the
dissenting opinions of Justice Stevens,joined by Justice Breyer,91 and Justice
Souter,joined by Justice Ginsburg,92 who argued that the cracking of District
24 constituted a section 2 violation.93 The Court's interpretation of section 2,
which mandates that there is minority-voter dilution only when a minority
group has obtained the status of a majority in any given district, is not a bold
footnote 4 move. Rather, it is a bright-line standard that reserves section 2
claims for those clear cases where a minority that has become a majority is
arbitrarily reduced to a minority again. The fact that the Court could not move
away from this bright line and recognize that the cracking of District 24 was
also a violation of section 2, indicates that the Court is not concerned with a
breakdown of the democratic process.
Taking a minority block of voters and splitting them up to ensure that
they have very little influence in the next election,falls squarely upon footnote
four of Carolene Products. The black voters in District 24, a discrete and
insular minority, had their vote diluted in a way that undermined their ability
to be represented in their district. The redistricting had the effect of spreading
the minority block in District 24 into five new districts-Districts 6, 12, 24,

89. Id. at 2624-25.
90. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2625 (2006).
91. Id. at 2626, 2641-46.
92. Id. at 2647-2651.
93. One would think that Justice Kennedy would have been extra sensitive to power of a minority
block that can act as a swing vote. In this case, as in many others over the last decade, he has taken on the
role of the swing voter. This has given him considerable power, as one who can either join the proverbial
left or the right of the Court on any given issue. What would happen to the power of his vote if they
expanded the Court to eleven members and appointed two more Justices, either to his left, or to his right?
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26, and 32. 94 This redistricting was not part of a democratic process, but its
purpose and effect were to further distort democracy by entrenching the
effective disenfranchisement of black minority voters. The Court responded
by arguing that the acceptance of such claims would "unnecessarily infuse
race into virtually every redistricting plan, raising serious constitutional
questions."95 Here, the Court explicitly rejected the minority-protecting
process view.
It is inconsistent with the spirit of Carolene Products footnote four to
withdraw the protection of discrete and insular minorities, simply because
they could not command a majority within a given district, particularly when
it is clear that the minority block can exercise its voting power to form a
coalition and eliminate a candidate that is its last choice. Since it is unclear
whether the minority block could get its first choice, the Court is not going to
protect the block's ability to secure its second-best choice against its worst
option. Thus, the Court abandons discrete and insular minorities, which
remain on the verge of absolute dilution, unrepresented, and powerless to
eliminate the candidate they prefer the least.96
V.

THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IS MORE WIDESPREAD AND
PRESSING IN THE AREA OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING THAN IN
SECTION 2 CLAIMS. YET NEITHER THE COURT'S DECISION IN LUI.AC, NOR
JUSTICE KENNEDY'S OPINION, PROVIDE MUCH HOPE THAT THE COURT
WILL ACT WITH VIGILANCE TO PROTECT THE PROCESS.

While Professor Tokaji should be commended for trying to find seeds of
hope in hard to find places, if the analysis above is correct, there is little room
under LULAC for those seeds to grow. If there is room for growth, political
scientists, such as Grofman and King, are likely correct that the area of
political gerrymandering has the most potential.97 Although beyond the scope
of Professor Tokaji's article, partisan gerrymandering is briefly addressed
here, in order to demonstrate that if the Court was concerned with
safeguarding the democratic process, it could have, and should have, taken the
opportunity to do so.
Rather than embracing a role for the courts to superintend the democratic
process, Justice Kennedy appears to think that the Court's involvement would

94. LUI.AC, 126 S. Ct. at 2647 (Souter,J.,dissenting in part).
95. LUI.AC, 126 S. Ct. at 2625 (citing Georgia v. Ashcroft,539 U.S. 461,491 (2003) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
96. Robert Dahl,in DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989),claimed that the ability to vote out an
incumbent in the next election was a necessary condition for democracy.
97. Grofman and King,supra note 16.
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be contrary to notions of the democratic process.98 He begins with the premise
that the legislature is best suited to draw congressional districts.99 As he
states, "drawing lines for congressional districts is one of the most significant
acts a state can perform to ensure citizen participation in republican self
governance. That Congress is the federal body explicitly given constitutional
power over elections is also a noteworthy statement of preference for the
democratic process." 100 He does not acknowledge or even appear to recognize
that states have been drawing these lines so as to undermine citizen
participation and republican self governance. As Burt Neuborn states:
In the 2006 campaign, out of the 435 available House seats, thirty-five
are contestable seats. Four hundred of the seats have been so rigged
and so gerrymandered that they are uncontestable. By using the
criteria of the American Political Science Association, you know who
is going to win before you cast your ballot. The election is a
formality. The reality took place when the lines were drawn in the
state legislature. 101
Rather than taking action to safeguard the democratic process, the Court
threw out some seeds for the legal community to ponder. As noted at the
outset, a majority of the Court is open to the possibility of a justiciable
standard for adjudicating such claims; Justice Kennedy, the key swing voter,
is himself open to this possibility within narrowly circumscribed situations.
However, in order to have the seeds planted, one must persuade the Court that
a judicially manageable standard exists. While the Court may have "seeded
the clouds" so to speak, one should not expect a downpour of justiciable
claims in partisan gerrymandering cases; rather, as in the section 2 cases, there
is potential for the Court to hear a few bright-line instances.
Political scientists Grofman and King, whose approach is widely used by
experts and accepted by academics for determining partisan fairness in
elections, have proposed the use of a partisan symmetry criterion for
determining prima facie cases of political discrimination in gerrymandering. 102
As they note, five members of the Court in LUI.AC indicated that the criterion
could be used as one part of a multipart test in partisan gerrymandering
98. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2006).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Neubom, supra note 2, at 944-45.
102. Grofman and King, supra note 16, at 4, 6. As King and Browning note: "We are aware of no
published disagreement or even clear misunderstanding in the scholarly community about partisan
symmetry as a standard for partisan fairness in plurality-based American elections since the clarification
and measures introduced by Gary King and Robert X. Browning in Democratic Representation and
Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections." 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1251, 1267 (1987).
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claims.103 The partisan symmetry standard" 'requires that the electoral system
treat similarly-situated parties equally, so that each receives the same fraction
of legislative seats for a particular vote percentage as the other party would
receive if it had received the same percentage [of the vote]."' 104
Partisan symmetry itself will only reveal how symmetrical the vote inputs
are, as compared to the vote outputs. One still needs to reach a threshold of
sufficient dissymmetry, or in other words, to demonstrate a sufficient level of
dissymmetry that would constitute unconstitutional gerrymandering. Grofman
and King set out five different threshold tests, all of which are judicially
manageable.105 The thresholds range from requiring the plan to: ( 1) have as
little bias as practicable;106 (2) not be predicted to result in the unfair loss of
a seat; 107 (3) not be predicted to be egregiously unfair in terms of a percentage
amount of dissymmetry (e.g., 1, 3, 5 or 10%); 108 (4) not be expected to result
in a party receiving a minority of votes, yet receiving a majority of the seats;109
or (5) not result in asymmetry that is both severe and worse than the previous
plan.110
The threshold tests are listed according to the level of aggression; if one
wanted to aggressively defend the democratic process, then option (1) is the
strongest test. Of these five options, Justice Kennedy has only indicated some
support for the latter two options, which are rather limited tests. While the
technology and science of voting has reached a point where these test could
be applied to accurately predict results,111 Justice Kennedy stated in LUI.AC
that the Court is "wary" of adopting a test that would apply to hypothetical
election results in the future, as opposed to a test that was applied after an
election has taken place." 2 Perhaps most importantly, Justice Kennedy
distinguishes cases in which a majority further entrenches itself by giving
itself more votes through gerrymandering from those cases in which a
minority is able to gerrymander the majority into a minority of seats.113 As
103. Id.
l 04. Id. (quoting King et al., Amicus Brief in LULAC v. Perry (2006) Submitted on Behalf of Neither
Party in the U.S. Supreme Court (No. 05-276) (2005)). Note that Grofrnan and King state in footnote 8 that
the amicus was submitted in Jackson v. Perry, was consolidated into LULAC.
105. Grofrnan and King, supra note 16 at 21-25. As they note, under any of these thresholds, the
determination of a violation would be straightforward, and any given state or line district line-drawer would
know in advance whether a proposed plan would pass review. Id. at 25.
106. Id. at 21.
107. Id. at 21-22.
108. Id. at 22.
109. Grofrnan and King, supra note 16, at 22-24.
110. Id. at 24-25.
III. Id. at 21.
112. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2006).
113. Id. at 2610.
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Grofman and King point out, this latter case is less likely to occur, since it is
generally the majority that draws the lines to help consolidate its majority
position. 114
If Justice Kennedy, and thereby the Court, cannot be moved to adopt a
less restrictive test, there is not a great deal of hope that the federal courts will
play an active role in superintending the democratic process. Rather, they will
continue to make the occasional incursion into policing a thriving American
"incumbantocracy."

114. Grofman and King, supra note 16, at 23. Of course, over time a party may find itself in such
disfavor that it no longer gets a majority of votes and then its redrawing of the districts would fall into the
latter category. As the authors note, this was the case of the 1991 pro-Democratic gerrymander in Texas.
Id. at 23.

